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ABSTRACT 
Incident information sharing is being encouraged and 
mandated as a way of improving overall cyber intelligence 
and defense, but its take up is slow.  Organisations may well 
be justified in perceiving risks in sharing and disclosing 
cyber incident information, but they tend to express such 
worries in broad and vague terms. This paper presents a 
specific and granular analysis of the risks in cyber incident 
information sharing, looking in detail at what information 
may be contained in incident reports and which specific 
risks are associated with its disclosure. We use the STIX 
incident model as indicative of the types of information that 
might be reported. For each data field included, we identify 
and evaluate the threats associated with its disclosure, 
including the extent to which it identifies organisations and 
individuals. The main outcome of this analysis is a detailed 
understanding of which information in cyber incident 
reports requires protection, against specific threats with 
assessed severity. A secondary outcome of the analysis is a 
set of guidelines for disciplined use of the STIX incident 
model in order to reduce information security risk. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy → Security services; Human and 
societal aspects of security and privacy; Governmental 
regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, cyber attacks have been rapidly 
increasing in number and complexity [1] [2]. Cyber 
criminals are becoming more organized, and cyber attacks 
are perpetrated for many reasons. The goal may be to 
obtain personal and sensitive information, such as credit 
card details or medical information, extortion, or to disrupt 
computer systems and critical infrastructures. 
There is a need for awareness and mitigation of threats 
even before the criminals start their attacks, particularly 
where critical assets are concerned. Understanding of 
previous attacks can provide the necessary information for 
protecting organisations.  Cyber intelligence information 
sharing involves the collection and analysis of cyber threat 
information. This can be done between peer organisations 
in the same sector (government, telecom, banks, or health), 
or through central authorities such as cybersecurity 
incident reporting teams (CSIRT). An effective incident 
reporting procedure using this information will increase 
the ability to provide timely responses to incidents, 
including alerts to information sharing parties. 
In order to assist the sharing process of cybersecurity 
information many standards and platforms are available 
such as STIX [3] and CybOX [4]. STIX is a language 
developed to represent and standardize cyber threat 
information. We will use the STIX incident model as an 
indicative representation of what may be included in cyber 
incident information. 
There are several legal factors that influence when and 
how cyber information sharing can take place. The EU’s 
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new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [5] will be 
a driving motivation for organisations to maintain high 
quality cyber security. In support of that, it also explicitly 
allows proportionate processing of personal data in order 
to support its overall goal of keeping personal information 
secure. The GDPR and the Directive on Security of Network 
and Information Systems (NIS Directive) [5] both mandate 
cyber incident reporting to authorities, and the latter 
encourages sharing for increased resilience. Many 
guidelines and studies highlight the presence of sensitive 
information elements within cyber threat information. In 
particular, NIST guidelines for cyber threat information 
sharing include rules for establishing information sharing 
relations [6]. They introduce examples of sensitive and 
identifiable information that may be present when sharing 
different types of threat information. However, they do not 
analyse the threats that arise as a consequence of sharing 
sensitive and identifiable information. In this paper we 
provide the first detailed analysis of this. 
Our overall goal is to improve and stimulate cyber 
information sharing, while mitigating its potential adverse 
effects. In this paper we provide a detailed understanding 
of the threats arising from sharing. Our systematic analysis 
of the threats in cyber incident information proceeds 
through the explicit consideration of the risks posed by the 
various pieces of information that could be included and 
the associated threats that they enable. By doing so, we 
show the risk of disclosing any information in the STIX 
incident model. The analysis also highlights areas where 
the necessarily flexible use of STIX induces additional 
disclosure risks; this naturally leads to guidelines on the use 
of STIX in order to mitigate these. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides background regarding cyber threat 
information sharing and its legal basis. Section 3 describes 
the methods used for threat analysis. Section 4 discusses 
the analysis of disclosing cybersecurity incident 
information in the STIX incident model with its the key 
findings. Finally, Section 5 briefly concludes the paper and 
proposes future research directions. 
2 Background 
This section provides general background, discussing 
models of cyber threat information sharing and in 
particular STIX, as well as the broader landscape of 
obstacles to cyber incident sharing and the legal context. 
2.1 Cyber intelligence sharing methods 
Cyber intelligence sharing covers incident reports as 
well as other types of information such as threats, 
vulnerabilities, mitigations, situational awareness, best 
practices and strategic analysis. Taking into consideration 
the breadth and quantity of information that might be 
exchanged, structured methods and automated systems are 
essential to make this practicable. Security software 
vendors’ websites and  “white papers” frequently present 
solutions, but it cannot entirely be disregarded that their 
main motivation is to sell security solutions. Standards 
organisations and researchers have started to develop and 
provide models and systems such as  “Threat Intelligence 
Sharing Platforms” [7]. These platforms provide automated 
support to information sharing and associated analysis. 
Several standards have been proposed, and others are still 
under development, for the automated exchange of cyber 
threat information. These include Cyber Observable 
eXpression (CybOX™) [4],  Structured Threat Information 
Expression (STIX™) [8],  An Open Framework for Sharing 
Threat Intelligence (OpenIOC), Incident Object Description 
Exchange Format (IODEF) [9] and Automated eXchange of 
Indicator Information (TAXII) [10][7]. In this paper, we will 
be using STIX, described next. 
2.2 Structured Threat Information 
eXpression (STIX) 
Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) [3] is 
a language for representing cyber threat information. It 
was developed in collaboration under the OASIS umbrella 
by a variety of parties interested in specification, capture, 
characterization and communication of standardized cyber 
threat information. STIX provides an architecture to 
support several components used to express the core of 
threat concepts, including: Cyber Observables, Indicators, 
Incidents, Adversary (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) 
(TTPs), Exploit targets, Courses of action, Cyber Attack 
Campaigns and Threat actors. STIX is considered the most 
commonly used standard in commercial products to 
automate information sharing [7]. To share STIX reports, 
we can use a standard called Trusted Automated Exchange 
of Intelligence Information (TAXII), which is an application 
layer protocol used to exchange cyber threat information 
in STIX over HTTPS [10]. 
2.3 Perceived threats and challenges for 
information sharing 
Organisations perceive significant barriers and 
challenges to sharing information for cyber intelligence 
analysis. The most obvious of these is the risk associated 
with disclosing sensitive information. Other barriers 
include trust among users and between users and platforms 
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 3 
providers, different privacy laws, as well as technical issues 
arising from different platforms and standards [11] [12]. 
It is necessary to establish a win-win environment 
where all entities get the benefit from sharing information, 
and avoiding entities that do not cooperate or just want to 
get benefit from the others (“free-riders”). In general, trust 
between the sharing partners needs to be established. One 
simple method of achieving this is to share information via 
a trusted central authority such as CERT-UK or CISP in the 
UK. Industry sector regulators could also be considered for 
this, but the punitive dimension of regulation may be a 
factor that inhibits the sharing of information. 
The largest perceived threats arise from information 
disclosure risks. Shared information about incidents may 
contain:  sensitive information related to the impact of the 
incident, the affected assets, personal information and data 
belonging to the victims and the incident reporters, 
information about the organization’s cybersecurity 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as competition-sensitive 
information about business processes. Threats may be to 
the organisation’s reputation or derived from concerns of 
intellectual property, business confidentiality or data 
protection.  However, this risk has not been previously 
analysed in detail.  
2.4 The legal context 
Cyber information sharing takes place in a legal context. 
Laws and regulation may both encourage and inhibit 
aspects of cyber information sharing. The main relevant 
laws for this in the EU context are the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Directive on 
Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS 
Directive), both having come into force in May 2018. 
GDPR. The GDPR is the primary law that sets out 
requirements for any companies processing personal data 
of EU citizens or from within the EU. As an EU Regulation 
it is immediately  binding to all member states [5][13]. 
The GDPR is concerned with the protection of “personal 
data”, which is “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person […]”.  In particular, this may also 
include “online identifiers”, such as IP addresses in certain 
contexts. There are also “special categories” of personal 
data, called “sensitive personal data” in previous laws; these 
will be infrequent in cyber incident reports, and we will use 
the term “sensitive information” in this paper in an 
informal rather than this legal sense. 
The GDPR is expected to be a main driver for improving 
cyber security in Europe in the near future, as it asks to 
“implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the 
risk” (Art.32). Such measures might include intelligence 
sharing – but what if there is personal data contained in 
that?  Figure 1 shows some of the STIX incident model 
properties which are more and less likely to contain 
personal data under the GDPR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any processing of personal data needs to be done on a 
legal basis, with Art.6(1) listing five possible bases besides 
consent, of which “legitimate interest” is of particular 
interest. This is because Recital 49 of the GDPR admits a 
legitimate interest for “processing for the purpose of 
ensuring network and information security, including 
preventing unauthorised access to electronic 
communications networks, and stopping damage to 
computer and electronic communication systems”. For any 
processing such as this which is based on legitimate 
interest, this justification needs to be balanced with 
potential adverse impact on the data subjects. In addition, 
one might consider the mandatory breach notifications of 
Art.33 to the relevant supervisory authority as a form of 
cyber incident information sharing. 
NIS Directive. The NIS Directive is the EU’s first piece of 
cyber security legislation. It requires the establishment of 
“Competent Authorities” (CA) which represent and 
regulate cyber security within critical sectors in their 
countries. Operators of Essential Services (OES) and Digital 
Service Providers (DSP) are required to report any incident 
affecting the availability, authenticity, integrity or 
confidentiality of data transmitted, stored or processed to 
the relevant CA. The CA in different countries are expected 
to share cyber intelligence. In addition, the CA can audit 
the OES/DSP’s cyber security provision, as well as instruct 
Reporter, 
Coordinator, 
Responder 
. .  
Location  
Contact 
(Email, Phone, 
Name)  
Affected 
Assets 
Impact 
Assessm
Possible GDPR personal data   Not likely within GDPR 
Total Loss 
Estimation 
Figure 1 Examples of the STIX incident properties 
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them on improvements.  Each EU member state will have 
needed to define legislation to implement the Directive, 
including methods for determining which organisations are 
OES/DSP as well as “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive” penalties for infringement [14]. The NIS 
Directive assigns the European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA)[15] a central role in 
providing cybersecurity advice and solutions. 
3 Threat analysis methods 
In our analysis of the data fields in the STIX cyber 
incident model, we will be indicating the roles the various 
attributes may play: they could contain sensitive 
information, or help to identify people and organisations. 
This is explored in Section 3.1 below. We then point out 
threats, using a taxonomy briefly described in Section 3.2. 
Finally, we assess the severity of privacy and security 
threats according to a methodology described in Section 
3.3. 
3.1 Sensitive information and the identification 
categories of attributes 
For categorizing sensitivity of data items in cyber 
incident reports, we use common characterizations from 
the literature on anonymization and de-identification 
methods [16] [17] . The attributes’ types are [18]:   
Identifier attributes include information used to identify 
an individual such as full name, driver license, and social 
security number. 
Quasi-identifier attributes include attributes that can be 
used together, or linked with an external source, to re-
identify individuals, such as gender, age, date of birth, 
postcode.  
Sensitive attributes include information that should be 
confidential, examples include disease, salary, etc. 
 Insensitive attributes are all other attributes and 
innocuous information. 
For a disclosure to be harmful, it needs to contain 
sensitive information about an identifiable subject. 
Although some attributes are not sensitive or identifying 
by themselves, combining them with other attributes may 
reveal sensitive information and identify organisations and 
individuals. 
3.2 Threat taxonomy 
In our systematic analysis that follows, we will use the 
threat taxonomy from ENISA [19] for categorizing the 
threats. The high level categories of this taxonomy are: 
• Physical attack (deliberate/ intentional) 
• Disaster (natural, environmental) 
• Failures/ Malfunction 
• Outages 
• Eavesdropping/ Interception/ Hijacking 
• Nefarious Activity/ Abuse 
• Legal 
• Unintentional damage/loss of information or IT 
assets 
3.3 Severity analysis of threats 
In traditional risk assessment, risks are evaluated for 
impact and likelihood. The latter is particularly problematic 
for risks that require action by an attacker to materialise: 
we would need to find out how likely it is that some 
attacker will be motivated to exploit a given weakness.  To 
avoid having to guess that motivation, we assess exposure: 
how easy would it be for a motivated attacker to exploit, 
and what prejudicial effects might be caused? This 
approach is taken for privacy risk  in the standard for 
privacy risk management by the French data protection 
authority CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique 
et des Libertés) [20]. We have generalized this to apply to 
cyber security risks as well. For privacy risks, the 
exploitability depends on how easy it would be to identify 
a specific individual, i.e. the level of identification. Table 1 
shows the description of the scores for this on a 1-4 scale, 
as taken from [20] . 
Table 1 Level of Identification 
Score Meaning Description 
1 Negligible 
Impossible to identify the 
individual 
2 Limited Possible but difficult to identify the 
individual 
3 Significant 
Relatively easy to identify the 
individual 
4 Maximum 
Extremely easy to identify the 
individual 
 
The prejudicial effects value of each threat is also 
scored on a 1-4 scale as given in [20]. Table 2 describes this. 
Table 2 Prejudicial Effects 
Score Meaning Description  
1 Negligible There is no problem 
2 Limited It could be inconvenient to the 
individual, partially affecting the 
system 
3 Significant There are significant consequences, 
with serious difficulties 
4 Maximum There are critical irrevocable 
consequences 
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Finally, The CNIL standard [20] computes the severity 
value by adding the level of identifiability and prejudicial 
effects of potential impacts values obtained and translates 
that into a risk severity scale as given in Table 3. We record 
the resulting severity as PS (Privacy Severity) for each risk 
in our analysis. 
Table 3 Severity Value 
Level of identification + Prejudicial 
effects  
Corresponding 
Severity 
< 5 1. Negligible 
= 5  2. Limited   
= 6  3. Significant 
> 6  4. Maximum 
 
As indicated above, we have generalized this method to 
also apply to cyber security risks, yielding Cybersecurity 
Severity (CSS) score. For this, we use Table 1 and Table 3 
unchanged, and instead of Table 2 we use the very similarly 
constructed Table 4 to score the ease of exploiting 
cybersecurity information.  
Table 4 Ease of Exploitation 
Scor
e 
Meaning Description  
1 Negligible Impossible to exploit cybersecurity 
information 
2 Limited Possible but difficult to exploit 
cybersecurity information 
3 Significant Relatively easy to exploit 
cybersecurity information 
4 Maximum Extremely easy to exploit 
cybersecurity information 
4  Information disclosure threat analysis of the 
STIX incident model 
In the following, we apply the methods described above 
to the STIX incident model. We illustrate what are the 
threats associated when disclosing any particular property 
in the incident model and identify the level of sensitivity 
and identification, as well as the severity of any associated 
threats. 
4.1  Information recorded in the analysis 
The overall objective of our analysis is to establish which 
information in cyber incident report needs to be protected 
and why. In order to achieve that, we take the STIX incident 
model as indicative for what might be included in such 
reports. For each property in every class of the STIX 
incident model we assign the threats associated with its 
disclosure based on its sensitivity and identification level. 
We analyse a total of 123 properties. Table 5 shows the 
analysis of an illustrative subset of attributes. Each STIX 
property is recorded in one row in the table, with labelled 
columns representing the relevant analysis and description. 
The columns: Complex Type, Include Free Text, Sensitivity, 
Identification, Personal information, Justification, Threat, 
Privacy Severity and Cybersecurity Severity contain our 
analysis of these properties. 
The Complex Type column indicates that the property’s 
type is a composite of other types. Therefore, its analysis 
may be derived from that of the component types. 
The Include Free Text column indicates that the property or 
one of its constituents is a free text field.  In principle, any 
information could be exposed through such an 
unconstrained field. Taking this to an extreme would 
trivialize our analysis: most of the information contained in 
an incident report would be potentially sensitive and 
identifying. We take a pragmatic approach to this: our 
analysis is based on the assumption that the person who is 
responsible for filling in the report will insert only 
information consistent with the property description and 
the context of the report. We acknowledge a vulnerability 
in the STIX incident model regarding information leaks, 
here and in general, due to the lack of constraints on fields. 
Minimizing the impact of this on information security 
requires a disciplined use of the model, as discussed later. 
The Sensitivity column indicates whether the property 
includes information that presents a confidentiality risk, 
such as IP addresses or the assets affected in the incident. 
In our analysis, we give for each property a sensitivity 
value, which will be either “Yes”,  “No”, or “It depends”: 
Yes: includes information that should be confidential, for 
example, financial information and the vulnerability 
exploited in the incident. 
It depends:  not necessarily sensitive but it could be in some 
cases; the Justification column then contains further 
elaboration of the circumstances.  
The Identification column indicates whether the property 
could identify an individual or the organisation. For each 
property, we provide an identification value, which will be 
one of the following: 
• Yes: it is information that likely identifies an 
organisation or an individual. 
• No:  knowing this information will not be helpful in 
identifying an organisation or an individual.  
• Quasi Identifier (QI):  the information could be linked 
with other information or an external source to re-
identify an individual or the organisation. 
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For identifying personal information that refers to 
individuals rather than organisations, we have added a 
Personal information column to indicate that the disclosure 
of the property could reveal personal information. 
The Threat column indicates the possible threats when 
revealing information associated with the property, based 
on the property description, sub-properties in case it is 
complex, and the actual information.  
The severity of the threats is given in the PS and CSS 
columns with scores assigned as described in Section 3.3. In 
fact in the table we include the original scores as e.g. 2+3 
for exploitability and impact without translating to the 1-4 
scale as per Table 3. The goal of this exercise is to identify 
potential threats when sharing incident information, to 
provide an explanation what the sensitivity and 
identifiability are, and ultimately to address the potential 
threat when disclosing information associated with 
properties of the STIX incident model. 
4.2  Analysis sample 
Table 5 gives an example of some properties in the 
IncidentType class of the STIX incident model. Cells in 
columns “Complex Type” (CT), “Include Free Text” (IFT) ,  
“Sensitivity” (S), “Identification” (I), “Personal Information” 
(PI), “Justification” and “Threat” represent our analysis. The 
values in the column “Property” are summarized from the 
STIX incident model.  
This table gives grounds behind our analysis of properties. 
Some properties have only a cybersecurity severity value 
such as “Security_Compromise”, and some properties have 
both privacy and cybersecurity severity values, such as 
“COA_Requested”, which contains identifiable information 
for the source of information, in addition to the sensitive 
information about the system and the infrastructure as 
well. We explain the values of PS and CCS for the following 
properties:  
“Description” property: It is a free text field to describe the 
incident. It is not unlikely that the reporter will include 
critical information in this field, which could contain 
cybersecurity and identifiable information. The PS value is 
2+2, as the level of identification is 2: it is possible to 
identify individuals with difficulty. The second value is the 
prejudicial effect which is also 2 due to the possible 
disclosure of the identity without further information. 
Similarly, the CSS is scored as 2+2 by assigning 2 as the 
difficulty of exploitation (any vulnerabilities are likely 
described at a very high level in this field), and 2 as the 
prejudical effects due to the problem of the data breach. 
“Reporter” property:  this contains both privacy and 
cybersecurity threats.  Since it contains explicit information 
about the reporter, it is very easy to identify the person. 
One of the possible outcomes might be identity theft. The 
cyber security risk is in revealing the identity of what is 
likely a good target for a spear phishing or other social 
engineering attack.  
“Security_Compromise” property: This property does not 
contain any identifiable information therefore the privacy 
severity is zero. On the other hand, the CSS is 3+3: 3 related 
to how easy to exploit which security sector has been 
compromised and based on that there is a possibility to 
perform many types of cyber-attacks such as an integrity 
attack on the data. For example, it could be a backdoor 
attack based on disclosed vulnerability that gives remote 
access to the victim’s system.  
“COA_Requested” and “Related_Indicators” properties 
both contain a privacy threat because of the 
“InformationSourceType” property in it, which might 
identify an individual. They also include a substantive 
cyber threat due to the course of action that implies 
vulnerabilities and the technical information such as IP 
addresses and information about network traffic that might 
be revealed. 
4.3  Severity results 
We have computed the severity values for each property 
of the STIX incident model based on the method proposed 
in Section 3.3. In Particular, Figure 2 shows the 
cybersecurity severity results for the first level properties 
of the STIX incident model. 
 
 
Figure 2 Cybersecurity Severity Results 
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Table 5 Analysis Sample for Class “IncidentType”  
 
Figure 3 shows the privacy severity results for the first level 
properties of the STIX incident model. 
 
Figure 3 Privacy Severity Results 
At first glance it may be surprising that Prejudicial Effects 
never achieve the highest score 4, for irrecoverable damage.  
Our explanation for this is rather different between the two 
dimensions. In the privacy dimension, this is an impact of 
the particular context of cyber incident reporting. Personal 
data never plays a central role in this, and there is no 
sensitive personal data involved in this scenario at all. 
Thus, any privacy risks will be limited. 
 
 
For the cyber security dimension, it is due to the nature of 
cyber security itself. It is extremely rare for a successful 
cyber attack, particularly in a critical infrastructure 
context, to exploit only a single vulnerability. Conversely, 
exploiting a single vulnerability is always unlikely to lead 
to irrecoverable damage by itself. 
This suggests an extension to our analysis per property is 
necessary. For a full awareness of overall risks, we need to 
look at combinations of properties that together provide a 
feasible composite attack threat. Although this is in theory 
unfeasible (nearly 2123 combinations of the 123 different 
properties), it can be triaged by focusing on known 
effective combinations of types of threats and the most 
severe individual threats.  
As an illustration, we describe a composite threat that could 
lead to irrecoverable damage to the system. In order to 
launch any serious attacks, the attackers need to collect 
data about the target’s activity. The ‘Reporter’ property will 
be an entry point for online research leading to a social 
engineering attack. This may lead to the installation of a 
key logger or other malware. The ‘Security_Compromise’ 
property might then reveal which security hole in a critical 
system can be exploited starting from the Reporter’s 
computer. A real-world example of a successful attack 
version
URL
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Time
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Leveraged_TTPs
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Intended_Effect
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level of identifiiability 
Property  CT IFT S I PI Justification Threat PS  CSS 
version      This refers to the report, not to the 
incident 
N/A 0 0 
Description     * free text field which is likely to  refer 
to particular business information, 
and may contain sensitive and 
identifying information 
Compromising confidential information 
(data breaches); Social Engineering; 
Violation of laws or regulations / 
Breach of legislation. 
2+2 2+2 
Reporter      The identity of the reporter can be 
revealed 
Identity theft (Identity Fraud/ Account); 
Social Engineering; Unauthorized 
activities 
4+2 2+2 
Security_ 
Compromise 
     Identifies whether critical 
information was leaked, and it can be 
sensitive 
loss of reputation; Loss of (integrity of) 
sensitive information 
0 3+3 
COA_ 
Requested 
     This can refer to specific information 
about the business, and how the 
organisation can return to business 
as usual. Recovery operation includes 
its own security risks which may be 
exploited in a targeted attack.  
 Man in the middle; Social Engineering; 
Generation and use of rogue 
certificates; Compromising confidential 
information (data breaches); Targeted 
attacks (APTs etc.) 
2+2 2+2 
Related_ 
Indicators 
     This can refer to specific information 
about the incident and adversary 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs). May contain identifying 
information about the adversary 
Loss of (integrity of) sensitive 
information; Social Engineering; Misuse 
of information/ information systems; 
Unauthorized activities Compromising 
confidential information (data 
breaches); Failure to meet contractual 
requirements 
2+2 2+2 
Analysis Sample for Class “IncidentType”. In columns, (CT) stands for Complex Type, (IFT) for Include-Free-Text, (S) for Sensitivity, (I) for 
Identification, (PI) for Personal Information, (PS) for Privacy Severity, (CSS) Cybersecurity Severity. For the values of the properties, ‘’ denotes ‘yes’, 
‘’  denotes ‘No’, ‘*’  denotes ‘It depends’. 
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against critical infrastructure is the Ukraine Attack [21]. 
This attack started by weaponising the network with 
BlackEnergy malware using spear-phishing attacks, then 
hijacking SCADA systems, and remotely controlling 
electricity substations. 
4.4  Key findings 
The analysis has provided a broad and detailed insight into 
the disclosure risks associated with cyber incident reports, 
when encoded in the STIX incident model. It has 
highlighted individual pieces of sensitive information as 
well as the specific threats arising from their disclosure. 
The STIX incident model consists of a hierarchy of classes 
containing 123 properties, and these were analysed 
separately. Properties may be sensitive both through their 
immediate content and through their specific context 
within complex properties. For example, the “Reporter” 
property tells us not only an employee name but also 
identifies the person who had reported the incident and so 
is likely in a central cybersecurity role in the organisation. 
The object-oriented structure of the STIX incident model 
implies that some sensitivity arises also through class 
inheritance: it may be inherited from a superclass, as well 
as arise in a specific subclass. In the following, we present 
general observations that follow from the analysis 
performed on the STIX incident model. 
 
Controlled/Uncontrolled properties identified in 
STIX incident model.  STIX is designed to be flexible and 
liberal about the information contained and how it is 
represented. The incident model suggests specific value 
sets for many properties, but also allows the content creator 
to choose any arbitrary value. This lack of constraints 
implies that undisciplined use may disclose arbitrary 
sensitive information. In particular, many properties 
consist of free text, which may contain critical information 
about the incident, including organisation name, IP 
addresses, impact and Course of Action, that must be 
protected. Tools for extracting sensitive and identifying 
information from text are available: these can be 
characterized as rule-based or machine learning-based [22]. 
The rule-based tools usually handle the re-identification 
goal with pattern matching, regular expressions and 
dictionary lookups. For example, the strings “DDoS” and 
“146.227.156.60” within some free text property could be 
classified into the categories of incident category and IP 
addresses. 
 
Categories of information and associated threats. 
Intuitively, we expected to find threats relating to different 
kinds of information disclosure: personal, organizational, 
financial and cybersecurity. Indeed, most STIX properties 
related specifically with one of these kinds, and have a 
matching set of associated threats. Moreover, for each of 
these types a significant number of properties is present in 
the STIX incident model.  
 
Disclosing personal information. The number of 
properties that identify individuals in the organisations is 
high, such as the Reporter property that characterizes the 
entity that reported the incident, and the Responder 
property that characterizes the entity playing the role of 
the responder for the Incident. Thus, disclosing any of these 
properties will be associated with multiple threats 
including targeted attacks (APTs etc.) and social 
engineering attacks, such as phishing and spear phishing. 
In [23], CERT-UK provides a case study of targeting a 
system administrator of a UK organization by a spear 
phishing attack. The attackers identified the system 
administrator and sent a spam email to the system 
administrator.  The goal of this attack was to install a RAT 
(Remote Access Trojan) and getting advantage of the 
administrator permission to get access to the network and 
collect sensitive information about the critical systems in 
this targeted organization.  
 
Disclosing the organisation’s information. The 
number of properties that potentially identify 
organisations is high. For example, the Affected_Asset 
property that specifies a list of one or more assets affected 
includes a description of the asset and the security effect on 
the asset, for example, a HR database server for an 
organisation. Thus, disclosing any of these properties will 
be associated with threats including physical attack as well 
as targeted attacks and social engineering. 
 
Disclosing financial information. The STIX incident 
model contains specific financial information that covers 
the estimated cost to the victim, which is based on the loss 
of revenue from system downtime and operation cost to 
fix the damage. For example, 
the Total_Loss_Estimation property specifies the total 
estimated financial loss for the Incident and the 
Response_And_Recovery_Costs property specifies the level 
of response and recovery-related costs. The loss of this 
confidential information forms a data breach threat by 
itself but it also has an associated threat of loss of 
reputation. 
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Disclosing cybersecurity information. The STIX 
incident model contains cybersecurity information about 
the incident, such as the Course_Of_Action property. This 
property refers to the course of action requested and taken 
for the incident. In addition, it includes specific information 
about the incident, such as whether non-public data was 
compromised and whether that data was encrypted or not. 
The organisation’s analysis of the incident can be reported 
through the Leveraged_TTPs property. Tactics, Techniques 
and Procedures (TTPs) consists of the specific adversary 
behavior (attack patterns, malware, exploits) exhibited and 
resources leveraged (tools, infrastructure, personas) [24].  
This information contributes to providing a complete 
understanding of the magnitude of the threat. However, 
disclosing cyber information details like these could give 
hackers a road map to conducting additional targeted 
attacks including physical ones.  
 
Some information is critical only in combination.  
Some properties are in general not sensitive, but become 
critical when combined with other properties or externally 
available information. For example, the 
First_Malicious_Action property specifies the time that the 
first malicious action related to the Incident occurred. This 
information is not sensitive by itself, but patterns in this 
information may lead to attribution (identification of the 
attacker) [25]. As an extreme example, for financial 
damages, neither the Amount nor the 
Iso_currency_code property by itself is sensitive; however, 
together they specify the estimated financial loss, which is 
sensitive. We have discussed the issue of critical 
combinations of cyber security vulnerabilities in detail in 
Section 4.3. 
4.5  The use of the STIX incident model 
As our analysis above indicates, there are clear drawbacks 
to the flexibility of the current STIX incident model. From 
the perspective of disclosure, free text fields and 
unconstrained properties allow for information leaks. In 
addition, they offer little perspective for data validation and 
thus scope for undetected human errors. The potential for 
automated processing is also greatly reduced by variability 
of inputs.  This calls for disciplined use of the STIX model, 
which is likely most easily provided by ensuring that the 
more flexible fields are filled through templates, possibly by 
a system generating STIX reports for the user from higher 
level information. (As STIX is XML based, which is not 
intended for human reading and writing, some such 
interface is essential for human interaction in any case.) 
Sector organisations could also develop custom versions of 
the STIX incident model that specialize to their specific risk 
profile. Implementation of STIX in cyber information 
sharing platforms could actively support this. In any case, 
consistent and disciplined use of incident reporting should 
be supported by appropriate training and policies within 
individual organisations. 
5  Conclusion and future work 
We have performed a comprehensive analysis of 
incident reporting information through the STIX incident 
model to identify the threats of disclosing sensitive and 
identifying information. We assigned the sets of possible 
threats based on the ENISA threat taxonomy. We identified 
the threats associated with each property, and evaluated 
those for severity in both the privacy and cyber security 
dimension. We now have a full overview of which incident 
information needs protecting, and why. In addition, we 
have provided guidance for disciplined use of the STIX 
incident model to reduce and focus information security 
risks. 
Our overall goal is to improve and stimulate cyber 
information sharing, while mitigating the potential adverse 
effects. The risk analysis of information sharing should 
provide organisations the means for making evidenced 
decisions on what information to share, and with whom. 
More sophisticated methods of sharing use privacy 
preserving techniques to reduce exposure risks [26]. 
Applicability of such techniques depends not only on the 
information, its sensitivity, and the level of trust in the data 
sharing partner, but also on the analysis to be performed. 
Ultimately, the sharing choices need to balance preserving 
confidentiality with preserving utility of the analysis. Thus, 
an exploration of such analysis operations is the next item 
on our agenda. 
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